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- 16. January 2010: The Social Value of the Gift Card
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Annotated Bibliography: “Wisdom” by Sharon Ryan
Ryan, S., “Wisdom”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Published January, 2008), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wisdom/>.
This encyclopedia entry outlines several ways of approaching a philosophically rigorous exploration of wisdom. The four approaches discussed are (1) epistemic humility, (2) epistemic accuracy, (3) knowledge, and (4) knowledge and action. (1), which finds most canonical expression in Socratic wisdom, asserts that S is wise iff S believes that s/he is not wise.This formulation is tempting, but it is obviously false. Many people accurately believe themselves to believe they are not wise, and it must be at least possible for someone to believe they are wise correctly (for instance, Socrates doesn’t cease to become wise after believing the oracle). Epistemic humility is rejected for epistemic accuracy, according to which S is wise if S believes herself to know P iff S knows P. Ryan rejects the epistemic accuracy view because wise people can have justified beliefs that are proven false when all things are considered (say, several years down the road). Further, the epistemic accuracy justification carries no constraints concerning how much S knows, or the sorts of things one knows. If one only has a minimal set of trivial beliefs, but is well justified in those beliefs and believes herself to know them, then she is wise. But this seems to miss something.
We might remedy this by suggesting a constitutive relationship between knowledge and wisdom. Here we find Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom, widely discussed and employed throughout the modern period. Theoretical wisdom is knowledge of the basic principles of nature, of what is, and what follows from these principles. Here we are acquainted with wisdom as extensive knowledge about the world. But, we protest, not all knowledge people are wise. Here, it seems, comes a question concerning how we want to talk about wisdom, prior to the question about what makes wise people wise. In the face of people who know alot but fail to get around the world skillfully, we may follow Aristotle in saying that such people possess theoretical wisdom, but lack practical wisdom. It seems others are tempted to understand Wisdom (as if it had a capital W) as a broad, all encompassing feature, which can’t be divied up like this, and for which factual knowledge (to the appropriate degree) is only a necessary condition (if that).
One could also insist that theoretical wisdom has nothing to do with wisdom, and that practical wisdom, knowing how to live well, is the essence of true wisdom. No doubt, the wise person will have to know some facts, but the knowing of facts in itself is orthogonal to wisdom. Wisdom consists only in the sort of knowledge that is in service of living well, such as:
…the most important goals and values of life – the ultimate goal, if there is one; what means will reach these goals without too great a cost; what kinds of dangers threaten the achieving of these goals; how to recognize and avoid or minimize these dangers; what different types of human beings are like in their actions and motives (as this presents dangers or opportunities); what is not possible or feasible to achieve (or avoid); how to tell what is appropriate when; knowing when certain goals are sufficiently achieved; what limitations are unavoidable and how to accept them; how to improve oneself and one’s relationships with others or society; knowing what the true and unapparent value of various things is; when to take a long-term view; knowing the variety and obduracy of facts, institutions, and human nature; understanding what one’s real motives are; how to cope and deal with the major tragedies and dilemmas of life, and with the major good things too. (Nozick, quoted in Ryan)
Finally, some want to amend this account of wisdom as living well, such that in order to be wise, one must not only know how to live well, but must also live well. This plausibly includes (since we’re working in a Platonic and Aristotelian vein) living virtuously. Ryan concludes that the most plausible account of wisdom has it that:
S is wise iff
- S has extensive factual and theoretical knowledge.
- S knows how to live well.
- S is successful at living well.
- S has very few unjustified beliefs.
[Note: I am going to be spending this summer trying to be more receptive, less ready with an attack, doing less of what Paul calls “Karate Chop Philosophy”. So these annotated bibliography entries will only rarely contain my own arguments.]