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Archive for the Metaphysics Category

Two posts I want to write in the near future, and a silly question about deodorant

Here are three nascent ideas.  Well…two nascent ideas.  The third is just a little bit of silliness.  But the first two, they’re ferreal…potential blog posts, potential papers, potential considerations that could figure into a broader position on relativism, perspectivalism, and the relationship between the two.

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What the first-personal-perspectival-realist might say about ‘disagreement’.

Last night, my buddy Joe wanted to know what disagreement among persons over first-person perspectival facts looks like for the metaphysician that wants to be a realist about such facts.  I think I gave a bad answer.  So I’m going to try again.  In particular, I want to try to make the point by exploiting an analogy that I am increasingly impressed with: the analogy between modal, temporal, and first-personal perspectives.

First, here’s the thesis.  Perspectives are sets of facts.  Sets of facts disagree when some propositon is in one set and its negation is in the other.  Two first personal perspectives disagree if some proposition is true from one perspective and its negation is true from the other.  This is disagreement among perspectives and it is (if I can get away with saying this) a metaphysical phenomenon.  It is distinct from conversational disagreement, such as two people arguing or debating over whether a proposition is true.  However, it’s plausible that faultless disagreement of the sort exploited by contemporary analytic relativism arises when conversational disagreement is over metaphysical perspectival disagreement of the sort I will be outlining here. Read the rest of this entry »

Leibniz On Causation

I’ve just completed and submitted a paper on Leibniz’s view of intrasubstantial monadic causation.  The paper was an evaluation of the “monadic states as formal and final causes of their subsequent states” model.  It can be found with the rest of my papers.

Footstamping for the consistency of imaginative states

((((I was going to post something on reasons and desires, but then the formatting bugged the hell out of me, so I saved the draft and will return to it tomorrow.  instead I’m going to post this draft from May of this year.  I’m not going to attempt to finish it.  I’m just going to post as is.  It’s probably horse shit.  I haven’t even read it.  Weeee!)))) Read the rest of this entry »

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